ABSTRACT. Encryption schemes based on the rank metric lead to small public key sizes of order of few thousands bytes which represents a very attractive feature compared to Hamming metric-based encryption schemes where public key sizes are of order of hundreds of thousands bytes even with additional structures like the cyclicity. The main tool for building public key encryption schemes in rank metric is the McEliece encryption setting used with the family of Gabidulin codes. Since the original scheme proposed in 1991 by Gabidulin, Paramonov and Tretjakov, many systems have been proposed based on different masking techniques for Gabidulin codes. Nevertheless, over the years all these systems were attacked essentially by the use of an attack proposed by Overbeck.
INTRODUCTION
McEliece encryption setting. Post-quantum cryptography aims at proposing schemes that resist to an hypothetical quantum computer. It represents more and more a serious alternative to classical cryptography based on the discrete logarithm problem and the factorization problem. McEliece opened the way to code-based cryptography by proposing the first post-quantum (public-key encryption) scheme [McE78] . The McEliece cryptosystem is in fact an encryption setting which relies on the hiding of particular class of decodable codes. The algorithmic assumption underlying the security is the difficulty of solving the closest vector problem with the Hamming metric for the particular class of masked decodable codes on which the scheme relies. Over the years many variants of the McEliece cryptosystem were proposed with different families of codes, and many were broken by recovering the structure of the masked codes. However the original family of codes, the binary Goppa codes, proposed by McEliece essentially remains unattacked. The resistance to structural attacks, which try to recover the structure of the masked codes, is the main potential weakness of this setting. For instance the highly structured Reed-Solomon codes are difficult to mask and most of McEliece variants relying on Reed-Solomon codes or variations on Reed-Solomon codes have been broken.
Rank metric cryptography.
The McEliece cryptosystem setting is very versatile and only needs a decodable family of codes along with a particular masking technique of codes. Hence this approach can also be used with another metric than the classical Hamming metric. An important metric emerging in cryptography is the rank metric which considers the ambient space F ab where F is a (finite) field and a and b are positive integers, as the space of a × b matrices so that we can associate the rank to any vector from F ab . By viewing any finite extension of finite fields F/K as a linear space over K of dimension m > 1 then for any positive integer n, the ambient space F n can also be viewed as the space of m × n matrices. In [GPT91] Gabidulin, Paramonov and Tretjakov proposed the first rank-metric based encryption scheme. This scheme can be seen as an analog of the McEliece's one but based on the class of Gabidulin codes.
The main interest of the rank metric is that the time complexity of best known generic attacks for rank metric grows faster regarding the size of parameters, than for Hamming metric. In practice, without additional structure like cyclicity, it means that it is possible to obtain public key sizes for rank metric of only a few thousand bytes, when hundred of thousand bytes are needed for Hamming metric.
An important operation in the key generation of the GPT cryptosystem is the masking phase where the secret Gabidulin code G undergoes a transformation to mask its inherent algebraic structure. This transformation is a probabilistic algorithm that adds some randomness to its input G . Originally, the authors in [GPT91] proposed to use a distortion transformation that outputs (a generator matrix of) the code G + R where R is random code with a prescribed dimension t R . The presence of R has however an impact: the sender has to add an error vector whose rank weight is t pub = t − t R where t is the error correction capability of the G . Hence, roughly speaking, the hiding phase publishes a degraded code in terms of error correction.
Gabidulin codes are often seen as equivalent of Reed-Solomon codes because, like them, they are highly structured. That is the reason why their use in the GPT cryptosystem has been the subject to several attacks. Gibson was the first to prove the weakness of the system through a series of successful attacks [Gib95, Gib96] . Following these failures, the first works which modified the GPT scheme to avoid Gibson's attack were published in [GO01, GOHA03] . The idea is to hide further the structure of Gabidulin code by considering isometries for the rank metric. Consequently, a right column scrambler P is introduced which is an invertible matrix with its entries in the base field F q while the ambient space of the Gabidlun code is F n q m . But Overbeck designed in [Ove05b, Ove05a, Ove08] a more general attack that dismantled all the existing modified GPT cryptosystems. His approach consists in applying an operator Λ i which applies i times the Frobenius operation on the public generator matrix G pub . The dimension increases by 1 each time the Frobenius is applied. Therefore by taking i = n − k − 1 the codimension becomes 1 if k is the rank of G pub . This phenomenon is a clearly distinguishing property of a Gabidulin code which cannot be encountered for instance with a random linear code where the dimension would increase by k for each use of the Frobenius operator.
Overbeck's attack uses crucially two important facts, namely the column scrambler matrix P is defined on the based field F q and the codimension of Λ n−k−1 (G pub ) is equal to 1. Several works then proposed to resist to this attack either by taking special random codes R so that the second property is not true as in [Loi10, RGH10] , or by taking a column scrambler matrix defined over the extension field F q m as in [Gab08, GRH09, RGH11] .
But recently in [OTKN16] it was shown that even if the column scrambler is defined on the extension field as in [Gab08, GRH09, RGH11] , by using precisely Overbeck's technique, it is still possible to recover very efficiently a secret Gabidulin code whose error correction t * is certainly strictly less than the error correction of the secret original Gabidiulin code but still strictly greater than the number of added errors t pub . In other words, an attacker is still able to decrypt any ciphertext and consequently, all schemes based on Gabidulin codes presented in [Gab08, GRH09, RGH11] are actually not secure.
Faure-Loidreau's approach. Besides the McEliece setting used with Gabidulin codes, Faure and Loidreau proposed in [FL05] another approach for designing rank-metric encryption scheme based on Gabidulin codes. The scheme was supposed to be secure under the assumption that the problem of the linearized polynomial reconstruction 1 is intractable. This scheme follows the works done in [AF03, AFL03] where a public-key encryption scheme is defined that relies on the polynomial reconstruction problem which corresponds to the decoding problem of Reed-Solomon codes. The Polynomial Reconstruction (PR) consists in solving the following problem: given two n-tuples (z 1 , . . . , z n ) and (y 1 , . . . , y n ) and parameters [n, k, w], recover all polynomials p of degree less than k such that p(z i ) = y i for at most w distinct indices i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. However the schemes have undergone polynomial-time attacks in [Cor03, Cor04, KY04] . The authors in [FL05] proposed then an analog of Augot-Finiasz scheme but in the rank-metric context. The security of [FL05] is related to the difficulty of solving p-polynomial reconstruction which corresponds to the decoding problem of Gabidulin codes with the rank metric. After Overbeck's attack, parameters proposed in [FL05] were updated in [Loi07, Chap. 7] in order to resist to it.
Our results. We show in this article that the Faure-Loidreau scheme is vulnerable to a structural polynomial-time attack that recovers the private key from the public key. Based in part on the security analysis given in [Loi07, Chap. 7], we show that by applying Overbeck's attack on an appropriate public code an attacker can recover the private key very efficiently, only assuming a mild condition on the code, which was always true in all our experimentations.
Informally, the Faure-Loidreau encryption scheme considers three finite fields
The rank weight of vectors is computed over the field F q . The public key is then composed of a Gabidulin code of dimension k of length n defined by a matrix G = (g i,j ) with g i,j ∈ F n q m and K = xG + z where x is some vector in L k and z is a vector of L n with (rank) weight w > 1 2 (n − k). Both vectors x and z have to be kept secret but from attacker's point of view the private key is essentially x since z can be deduced from it.
Our attack uses the Frobenius operator, introduced by Overbeck, which takes as input any vector space U ⊆ F n q m and integer i 1 in order to construct the vector space Λ i (U ) defined as
The first step of the attack considers a basis γ 1 , . . . , γ u of L viewed as a vector space over F q m of dimension u > 1 and defines the vectors v i = Tr L/F q m (γ i z). Our main result shows that the system can be broken in polynomial time and can be stated as follows:
Note that if V behaves as random code then generally the condition (1) holds. We implemented our attack on parameters given in [FL05, Loi07] for a 80 bits security, which were broken in a few seconds.
PRELIMINARIES
Vectors from F n where F is a field are denoted by boldface letters as a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ). The concatenation of two vectors u and v is denoted by (u | v). The set of matrices with entries in F having m rows and n columns is denoted by M m,n (F) and the subset of n × n invertible matrices form the general linear group denoted by GL n (F). A linear code C of length n over a field F is a linear subspace of F n . An element of a code is called a codeword and a matrix whose rows form a basis is called a generator matrix. The dual of a code C ⊂ F n is the linear space denoted by C ⊥ containing vectors z ∈ F n such that:
Any generator matrix of C ⊥ is called a parity-check matrix of C . An algorithm D : F n → C is said to decode t errors in a code C ⊂ F n if for any c ∈ C and for any e ∈ F n such that |e| q t we have D(c + e) = c. Generally, we call such a vector e an error vector.
The finite field with q elements is denoted by F q where q is a power of a prime number p. The trace operator of 
Any univariate polynomial f ∈ F q m [X] of the form f 0 + f 1 X q + · · · + f k X q d where 0 d < m is a called a q-linearised polynomial and d is its q-degree.
Any map h : U → V is naturally extended to vectors x ∈ U n by h(x) = (h(x 1 ), . . . , h(x n )). This applies in particular to the cases where h is a polynomial or is the Frobenius (and trace) operator. For any subsets U ⊂ F n and V ⊂ F n the notation U + V represents the set {u + v | u ∈ U and v ∈ V }. For any subfield K ⊆ F and x form F n the K-vector space generated by x is denoted by Kx. For any U ⊂ F n and for any P ∈ GL n (K) the notation U P is used to denote the set {uP | u ∈ U }. For any subset V ⊆ F n q m and any integer i 0 we define V q i as the set of vectors
n ) where v describes V . Note that when V is a vector space then V q i is also a linear subspace of F n q m .
Definition 2. The rank weight of x ∈ F n q m denoted by |x| q is the dimension of the F q -vector space generated by {x 1 , . . . , x n }, or equivalently
Note that for any x ∈ F n with |x| q = w there exists P in GL n (F q ) and x * ∈ F w q m such that xP = (x * | 0) and |x * | q = w.
GABIDULIN CODES
We now introduce an important family of codes known for having an efficient decoding algorithm for the rank metric.
Definition 3 (Gabidulin code
Equivalently, a generator matrix of G k (g) is given by G where
Gabidulin codes are known to possess a fast decoding algorithm that can decode errors of weight t provided that t ⌊ 1 2 (n − k)⌋. Furthermore the dual of a Gabidulin code G k (g) is also a Gabidulin code.
Proposition 4. The dual of G k (g) is the Gabidulin code G n−k h q −(n−k−1) where h belongs to
G n−1 (g) ⊥ and |h| q = n.
Proof. Since h ∈ G n−1 (g) ⊥ we have for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 2}
In particular, for all i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1},
Finally, we necessarily have |h| q > n − 1 since dim G n−1 (g) = n − 1.
Proposition 5. For any P in GL n (F q ) and for any Gabidulin code
We gather important algebraic properties about Gabidulin codes in order to explain why many attacks occur when the underlying code is a Gabidulin code G k (g). One key property is that Gabidulin codes can be easily distinguished from random linear codes. This singular behaviour has been precisely exploited by Overbeck [Ove05b, Ove05a, Ove08] to mount attacks. For that purpose we introduce the operator Λ i defined for any linear vector subspace U ⊆ F n q m by
This operator can also be defined over matrices in an obvious manner. For instance a generator matrix of G k (g) is Λ k−1 (g). This implies in particular the next proposition.
Proposition 6. For any
The importance of Proposition 6 becomes clear when we compare it to the case of random codes.
Proposition 7. Let A ⊂ F n q m be a code generated by a randomly drawn matrix from M k,n (F q m ) then with a high probability
Remark 8. Another way of understanding the previous proposition is to observe that if A is random code then dim A ∩ A q = 0 whereas for Gabidulin codes we would obtain
Thus there is property that can be computed in polynomial time such that it distinguishes between a Gabidulin code and a random code. This important fact has been used successfully in cryptography to several encryption schemes [COT14, CGG + 14, OTK15].
FAURE-LOIDREAU ENCRYPTION SCHEME
Key generation. Throughout this step, besides the fields F q and F q m , another field L is considered where L is the extension of F q m of degree u > 1, and three integers k, n and w such that u < k < n and
(1) Pick at random g ∈ F n q m with |g| q = n and let G ∈ M k,n (F q m ) be the generator matrix of
Generate randomly s ∈ L w with |s| q = w and P ∈ GL n (F q ) and then compute z ∈ L n defined as
The private key is (x, P ) and the public key is (g, k, K, t pub ) where
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Encryption. A plaintext here is a vector m = (m 1 , . . . , m k ) belonging to F k q m such that m i = 0 when i ∈ {k − u + 1, . . . , k}. To encrypt then m one randomly generates α ∈ L and e ∈ F n q m such that |e| q t pub . The ciphertext is the vector c ∈ F n q m defined by c = mG + Tr L/F q m (αK) + e.
(12)
Decryption. The receiver computes first cP that is to say
Let G ′ be the k × (n − w) matrix obtained by removing the first w columns of GP and let e ′ and c ′ be respectively the restriction of eP and cP to the last n − w coordinates. We then have
Using the fact that G ′ generates a Gabidulin code of length n − w and dimension k < n − w and since |e ′ | q |e| q ⌊ 1 2 (n − w − k)⌋, it is possible to recover m ′ = m + Tr L/F q m (αx) by applying a decoding algorithm. Since by construction m ∈ F k q m is chosen so that m i = 0 when i ∈ {k − u + 1, . . . , k} then by choosing a dual basis {x * k−u+1 , ..., x * k } of {x k−u+1 , . . . , x k } the value of α can be computed as the following
Once α is recovered, the plaintext m is then equal to m ′ − Tr L/F q m (αx).
POLYNOMIAL-TIME KEY RECOVERY ATTACK
In this section, we show that it is possible to recover an alternative private key from the public data K and G. We start by remarking that if an attacker A is able to find a matrix T ∈ GL n (F q ) and z * ∈ L w such that zT = (z * | 0) and |z * | q = w then A can fully recover x ∈ L k by solving only the last n − w equations of the following linear system (see Algorithm 1 for more details)
In the sequel, we describe a way to obtain x by finding such a matrix T . The first step is to consider a basis γ 1 , . . . , γ u of L viewed as a vector space over F q m of dimension u > 1. For any i ∈ {1, . . . , u}
Lastly, let C pub ⊂ F n q m be the (public) code generated by K 1 , . . . , K u and G k (g), that is to say
Remark 9. C pub is defined by the generator matrix G pub where
For all i ∈ {1, . . . , u} let us set
By construction, we also have the equality
It is sufficient to use Proposition 5 and to observe that
then of dimension 1 generated by (0 | h) P T where h ∈ F n−w q m and |h| q = n − w.
Furthermore, for any h ∈ Λ f (C pub ) ⊥ with h = 0 and for any T ∈ GL n (F q ) such that
where h ′ ∈ F n−w q m , there exists z * ∈ F w q m with |z * | q = w such that zT = (z * | 0).
Proof. Let us decompose GP as (L | R) where L ∈ M k,w (F q m ) and R ∈ M k,n−w (F q m ). Let B ∈ M u,w (F q m ) be the matrix where the i-th row is composed by the w first components of b i . Note that G pub P where G pub is defined as in (18) is a generator matrix of C pub P , and the following equality holds
Hence Λ f (G pub P ) = Λ f (G pub )P is a generator matrix of the code Λ f (C pub P ) = Λ f (C pub )P which satisfies the equality
The fact that R generates an (n − w, k)−Gabidulin code implies that
Consequently, there exists h ∈ F n−w q m with |h| q = n − w that satisfies Λ f (R) h T = 0. Furthermore, the equality dim Λ f (B) = Λ f (B) holds which implies that
This means that (0 | h) generates actually the full space Λ f (C pub )P ⊥ which is equivalent to say
For the second part of the proposition, let h be any element from Λ f (C pub ) ⊥ with h = 0 and let T be in GL n (F q ) such that (20) holds for some h ′ in F n−w q . There exists an element α in F q m such that h = (0 | αh)P T . Consider matrices A 1 , A 2 , A 3 and A 4 such that A 1 ∈ M w,w (F q ) and A 4 ∈ M (n−w),(n−w) (F q ) so that we have
We have then the following equalities
It follows from (22) that hA T 2 = 0 and hence A 2 = 0 since |h| q = n − w. So we can write
We deduce that
So by letting z * = sA
1 we have proved the proposition.
Proposition 11 shows that an equivalent key can be found in polynomial time by simply using a non zero element of Λ f (C pub ) ⊥ . We now prove our main result stated in the introduction which shows the weakness of the system. Proof. Firstly, note that from (19) we know that V P = B. Algorithm 1 gives the full description of the attack and provides a proof of Theorem 1. Indeed, the attack consists in picking any codeword h from Λ n−w−k−1 (C pub ) ⊥ and then, by Gaussian elimination, we transform h so that there exists T ∈ GL n (F q ) for which we have
n−w q m . From Proposition 11 we know that T is an equivalent key that will gives an equality of the form (16), and therefore it is possible by solving a linear system to find x. Lastly, the time complexity comes from the fact the operations involved are essentially Gaussian eliminations over square matrices with n columns and entries in L.
An important assumption for the success of the attack is that dim Λ n−w−k−1 (C pub ) ⊥ = 1 which was always true in all our experimentations. This assumption is true if and only if the equality dim Λ n−w−k−1 (B) = w holds, which implies to have u(n − w − k) w, that is to say
Assuming that B behaves as a random code then dim Λ n−w−k−1 (B) = w would hold with high probability as long as (23) holds. The parameters proposed in [Loi07] satisfy the bound given in (23). Furthermore, the analysis given in [Loi07] implies to take u 3. We implemented the attack with Magma V2.21-6 and the secret key x was found in less than 1 second confirming the efficiency of the approach. Finally, let us observe that taking w > u u+1 (n − k) would imply for t pub < 0 since we have t pub < 1 2 (n − w − k) < 1 2 − u u + 1 (n − k) < 0.
Algorithm 1 Key recovery of Faure-Loidreau scheme where the public key is (G, K) K i ← Tr L/F q m (γ i K) 4: end for 5: Let C pub ⊂ F n q m be the code generated by G pub ⊲ G pub is defined as in (18) 6: if dim Λ n−w−k−1 (C pub ) ⊥ = 1 then 7:
Pick at random h ∈ Λ n−w−k−1 (C pub )
Compute T ∈ GL n (F q ) and h ′ ∈ F n−w q m such that h(T −1 ) T = 0 | h ′ 9:
Solve the linear system where (X 1 , . . . , X k ) are the unknowns (L) :
z ← K − xG where x is the unique solution of (L) 13: end if 14: return (x, z) TABLE 1. Bound on w with parameters taken from [Loi07] . Faure and Loidreau proposed a rank-metric encryption scheme based on Gabidulin codes related to the problem of the linearized polynomial reconstruction. We show that the scheme is vulnerable to a polynomial-time key recovery attack based on Overbeck's techniques applied on an appropriate public code. Our attack is another example that the use of Gabidulin codes in cryptography leads to an insecure scheme. This work and the attack given in [OTKN16] clearly question the idea of building cryptographic schemes on Gabidulin codes since all strategies have failed to hide their algebraic structure.
